Can public insurance through redistributive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy in which private risk sharing is limited? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is incomplete because some insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley, 1986 and Aiyagari, 1994) publicly provided risk sharing via a tax system generally improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by the absence of complete enforcement (as in Levine, 1993 and then the provision of public insurance can crowd out private insurance to such an extent that total consumption insurance is reduced. By reducing income risk the tax system increases the value of being excluded from private insurance markets and hence weakens the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. In this paper we theoretically characterize and numerically compute equilibria in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing realistic income risk and tax systems with various degrees of risk reduction (progressivity). We find that the crowdingout effect of public insurance on private insurance in the limited enforcement model can be quantitatively important, as is the positive insurance effect of taxation in the Bewley model.
Introduction
Should the government provide public insurance against idiosyncratic income uncertainty by implementing a progressive tax system in which households with higher income realizations pay higher average tax rates, thus making the after-tax labor income process less risky than the pre-tax labor income process? The answer that economic theory gives to this question depends on the assumptions about the structure of private insurance markets. If these markets are complete, in that agents can trade a complete set of perfectly enforceable insurance contracts, then complete risk sharing is achieved via private markets and progressive income taxes provide no additional insurance. If, on the other hand, private insurance markets do not implement full risk sharing redistributive taxes might generate welcome additional insurance. As Mirrlees (1974) , Varian (1980) and others have pointed out, this beneficial effect of progressive income taxes has to be traded off against the adverse effect on incentives to supply labor and to accumulate capital, leading to a nontrivial optimal taxation problem.
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In this paper we demonstrate that if one models the frictions that lead to incomplete risk sharing in the first place explicitly, then the public provision of insurance may adversely affect the way private insurance markets work. Our main substantive contribution is to show that if private risk sharing is limited because private insurance contracts can only be enforced through exclusion from participating in financial markets in the future, then the provision of public insurance crowds out the provision of private insurance against idiosyncratic uncertainty, potentially more than one for one. That is, by attempting to better insure households against idiosyncratic risk the government achieves exactly the opposite, namely a worse risk allocation of private consumption.
Our exact modelling approach follows the work by Levine (1993, 2001 ) and and does not impose a priori restrictions on the set of private insurance contracts that can be traded.
These contracts, however, can not be fully enforced. 3 The only enforcement mechanism is the threat of exclusion from future credit and insurance markets upon default. Tax liabilities, however, are not subject to this enforcement problem as we assume that the penalty for defaulting on tax payments can be made prohibitively large by the government. If agents default on their private debt, they are banned from future credit and insurance markets, but retain their private (labor) endowment which is still subject to income taxation. A change in the tax system changes the severity of punishment from default by altering the utility an agent can attain without access to insurance markets and thus changes the extent of enforcement of private contracts. Since enforcement defines the extent through which private contracts are used, a change 2 A second common justification for redistributive taxation is the social desire to attain a more equal income or wealth (and hence consumption and welfare) distribution. Although we believe that this justification is potentially important we will not address this point in this paper. See the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971) for an analysis of the trade-off between the equity and the labor supply incentive effect of redistributive taxation. 3 Another fraction of the literature derives market incompleteness from informational frictions underlying the phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard (see Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and their review of the literature). Optimal taxation is this class of models is the main focus of the recent New Dynamic Public Finance literature, see Kocherlakota (2006) and for overviews. Marcet and Marimon (1992) is an early study that evaluates the importance of both frictions for economic growth.
in the tax system changes the use of private contracts. The allocative and welfare consequences of a change in the tax system then depend on the relative magnitudes of the change in public risk sharing implemented by the new tax system and the change in risk sharing through private insurance markets.
We evaluate this trade-off in a quantitative example and find that the crowding-out effect from the progressive income tax system characterized in this paper can be quantitatively important. In this example households face income risk of a magnitude estimated from US household data, and are subject to a simple tax system with a constant marginal tax rate and a constant transfer. To quantify the impact of changes in the tax code on household labor income and consumption risk we construct and compute three measures of risk sharing for the income and consumption distributions: Private risk sharing, which is the reduction of consumption risk below after-tax income risk stemming from private financial markets; public risk sharing, which is the reduction in income risk stemming from the progressivity of income taxes and total risk sharing which is (essentially) the sum of the two. When comparing steady state consumption allocations arising under different tax systems we find that making taxes more progressive always increases public risk sharing (by construction) and always reduces private risk sharing; in some case the reduction of private risk sharing is bigger than the increase in public risk sharing so that increasing the progressivity of the tax code leads to less total risk sharing among households. We also show that this more than one-for-one crowding out result never appears in a standard incomplete markets model in the spirit of Bewley (1986) , Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) in which explicit risk sharing is limited for reasons exogenous to the model.
It is important to note that our quantitative analysis only focuses on the risk sharing effect of taxes and therefore abstracts from many elements that are important in the design of optimal taxes such as the presence of distortions of labor supply and savings decisions or a society's preference for redistribution. Thus our findings do not necessarily advocate a particular optimal tax schedule. They simply suggest that, when studying optimal taxation ignoring the effects that the tax system has on the functioning of private financial markets could be a first order omission. 4 The main methodological contribution of this paper is the characterization of the consumption allocation and distribution of a general equilibrium limited commitment model with a continuum of agents facing idiosyncratic income risk. This model allows us to analyze insurance mechanisms involving the entire population and not only pairwise relationships. We view this as crucial in our analysis of risk sharing arrangements such as progressive taxation since gains from insurance are particularly sizable among a large pool of agents with mostly idiosyncratic (i.e. largely uncorrelated) income risk. We demonstrate this by comparing the consumption allocations in our continuum economy to those arising in a model with only two agents (as studied by , Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , Kehoe and Levine (2001) , among others) and show that the allocation of income risk in these two models is qualitatively different.
5 In addition our model, in contrast to the previous literature, endogenously delivers a rich cross-sectional consumption distribution and thus may be of independent interest for the study of other policy reforms where distributional issues are important. But it is exactly the rich cross-sectional dimension of the model that leads to considerable theoretical and computational complications in solving it. To this end we adapt the methodology of Lucas (1992, 1995) who study efficient allocations in an economy with a continuum of agents and private information to our environment with limited commitment. We then show, following Kehoe and Levine (1993) , how to decentralize efficient allocations as equilibrium allocations in a standard Arrow Debreu equilibrium with individual rationality constraints.
In a related paper Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) use a limited commitment model to study the effect of mandatory public insurance programs against aggregate risk on private insurance arrangements against idiosyncratic risk. Although their economy is populated by a large number of (potentially heterogeneous) agents, by assumption agents can only enter pairwise insurance arrangements, not involving any other member of the population. So their underlying insurance problem is equivalent to the ones studied by and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) . Similar to our result they show that the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks can be insured depends negatively on the public provision of insurance against aggregate uncertainty. A similar qualitative result is obtained by in their study of a model with endogenous private insurance markets which are subject to private information (rather than limited enforcement) frictions. In a model of informal family insurance Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) show that government provided unemployment insurance can crowd out informal insurance provided by the family more than one for one, a result similar to ours. On the empirical side, Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Brown et al. (2007) measure the degree to which the public provision of health insurance through Medicaid crowds out the private provision of insurance and estimate it to be substantial.
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000, 2002) set up a model with a finite, but potentially large number of agents that can engage in mutual insurance schemes. Once they solve for constrained-efficient insurance contracts numerically, however, they need to restrict attention to economies with either two agents (as in Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000) , in a model with capital accumulation), or they need to assume that agents engage in contracts with the rest of the population, treating the rest of the population as one agent (as in Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) ). This again reduces the problem to a bilateral insurance problem as in the other papers discussed previously. 6 Krueger and Uhlig (2006) study a limited commitment model with a continuum of agents, but focus on endogenizing the value of default through competition. In their paper the interest rate is treated as exogenous, while it is endogenously determined, jointly with the consumption distribution in the current paper. As Krueger and Uhlig (2006) , the recent work by Broer (2009) contains an explicit characterization of the stationary consumption distribution under specific assumptions on preferences and the idiosyncratic income process, as well as a complete existence proof of a stationary equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the model environment and define equilibrium.
In Section 3 we define and characterize efficient allocations. Section 4 discusses the decentralization. Section 5 presents qualitative features of the equilibrium and compares the qualitative features of the consumption allocation in the continuum economy with that arising in a simple economy with two agents and perfectly negatively correlated income shocks. Section 6 provides a quantitative thought experiment of changing the progressivity of the income tax code, both within our model and a standard incomplete markets Bewley (1986) model. Section 7 concludes; figures and proofs of the main propositions are contained in the appendix.
2 The Economy
There is a continuum of consumers of measure 1, who have preferences over consumption streams given by
The period utility function u : + → D ⊆ is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions. Its inverse is denoted by C : D → + . Hence C(u) is the amount of the consumption good necessary to yield period utility u. LetD = sup(D); note that we do not assume u to be bounded so thatD = ∞ is possible.
An individual has stochastic endowment process e ∈ E, a finite set with cardinality N , that follows a Markov process with transition probabilities π(e |e). In what follows we use the words endowment and income synonymously. For each consumer the transition probabilities are assumed to be the same. We assume a law of large numbers, 8 so that the fraction of agents facing shock e tomorrow with shock e today in the population is equal to π(e |e). We assume that π(e |e) has unique invariant measure Π(.). Without loss of generality we normalize average incomeē = e eΠ(e) = 1.
We denote by e t the current period endowment and by e t = (e 0 , .., e t ) the history of realizations of endowment shocks; also π(e t |e 0 ) = π(e t |e t−1 ) · · · π(e 1 |e 0 ). We use the notation e s |e t to mean that e s is a possible continuation of endowment shock history e t . We also assume that at date 0 (and hence at every date), the cross-sectional measure over current endowment is given by Π(.), so that the aggregate endowment is constant over time. At date 0 agents are distinguished by their initial asset holdings, a 0 (claims to period zero consumption) and by their initial shock e 0 . Let Θ 0 be the joint measure of initial assets and shocks.
The government provides implements income insurance through a tax policy τ (e t ) that is constant over time. Since we want to focus on the public and private allocation of risk in this paper we focus on the case in which net revenues generated from the tax system are equal to zero. 9 We take the tax policy τ (.) as exogenously given (but vary its implied progressivity in our quantitative work). For an individual we let y t = e t (1 − τ (e t )) be the after-tax income. Since the function τ (.) does not depend on time, for a given tax function τ (.) there is a one-to-one mapping between pre-tax and after-tax endowments. From now on we let y ∈ Y ⊆ ++ denote an individual's generic after-tax endowment, following the Markov process π with invariant distribution Π and denote by y t = (y 0 , . . . y t ) a history of after-tax endowment shocks. Taxes τ (.)
satisfy a period-by-period budget constraint et e t τ (e t )Π(e t ) = 0
With this assumption resource feasibility for this economy states that the sum of all agents' consumption has to be less or equal than the sum over all individuals' after-tax endowment, which equals 1 in every period. 10 Therefore, τ (.) is fixed and hence the after-tax endowment process is specified, we can carry out the subsequent analysis without explicit consideration of the government.
Consumers can trade a full set of state-contingent commodities. A consumption allocation c = {c t (a 0 , y t )} specifies how much an agent of type (a 0 , y 0 ) consumes who experienced a history of endowment shocks y t .
Individuals, at any point in time, have the option to renege on existing contracts. The only punishment for doing so, and hence the only enforcement mechanism for contracts, is that agents that default on their contracts are banned from future insurance markets. They are, however, allowed to self-insure by saving (but not borrowing) at an exogenous constant interest rate r. 11 The expected continuation utility for an agent who defaults after history y t is given by U Aut (y t ; r) = U (0, y t ), where U is the solution to the functional equation
with a 0 = 0 given. It is obvious that U Aut (y t ; r) is strictly increasing in y t , as long as the income shocks are uncorrelated or positively correlated over time.
Individuals have no incentive to default on a consumption allocation c, at any point in time and any contingency, if and only if an allocation satisfies following continuing participation or debt constraints
through taxes. 10 This immediately follows fromē = 1 and equation (2) . 11 This assumption is motivated by current US bankruptcy laws. Agents filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 must surrender all their assets above certain exemption levels; the receipts from selling these assets are used to repay the consumer's debt. Remaining debt is discharged. In most cases of Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors have no non-exempt assets (see White (1998) ), so the consequences of filing for bankruptcy only entail restrictions on future credit. Individuals that declared personal bankruptcy are usually denied credit for seven years from major banks and credit card agencies. We view our assumption of being banned forever as a first (and easily tractable) approximation, keeping in mind that it may overstate the punishment from default.
For explicit model of bankruptcy within the context of the standard incomplete markets Bewley (1986) mode see Chatterjee et al. (2007) . The attractive feature of their model and the large literature it has spawned is that default occurs with positive probability in equilibrium.
i.e. if the continuation utility from c is at least as big as the continuation utility from defaulting on c, for all histories y t . Since there is no private information and markets are complete, exclusion will not happen in equilibrium as nobody would offer a contract to an individual for a contingency at which this individual would later default with certainty.
Notice that our specification of the debt constraint is more general than the one introduced by Kehoe and Levine (1993) in which agents who default are not allowed to save. If r = −1, our model is equivalent to theirs and the right hand side of the debt constraint reduces to
¿From now on, whenever there is no danger of ambiguity, we omit the dependence of U Aut t on r.
Equilibrium
We now define a competitive equilibrium for the economy described above. We will follow the approach of Kehoe and Levine (1993) . Consider an agent with period zero endowment of y 0 and initial wealth of a 0 .
Wealth is measured as entitlement to the period 0 consumption good. Let Θ 0 be the joint distribution over (a 0 , y 0 ) and denote by p t (y t ) the date zero price 12 of a contract that specifies delivery of one unit of the consumption good at period t to/from a person who has experienced endowment shock history y t . For each contingency c t (a 0 , y t ) − y t is the net trade of individual (a 0 , y 0 ) for that contingency. In period 0 there is no uncertainty, so normalize the price of the consumption good at period 0 to 1.
A household of type (a 0 , y 0 ) chooses an allocation {c t (a 0 , y t )} to solve
Note that, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) , the continuing participation constraints enter the individual consumption sets directly.
Definition 1 An equilibrium consists of prices {p t (y t )} ∞ t=0 and allocations {c t (a 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 such that
• given prices, the allocation solves household's problem for almost all (a 0 , y 0 ) 12 Note that in standard Arrow Debreu equilibrium theory with finitely many consumers, a complete description of the state of the economy would be everybody's endowment shock history, and all prices would be contingent on this complete state. With atomistic individuals, the assumed law of large number and no aggregate uncertainty, attention can be restricted to equilibria in which prices (and quantities) depend only on own personal histories.
• markets clear, i.e. for all t,
As is clear from the equilibrium definition our economy does not include physical capital accumulation or government debt, so assets are in zero net supply and the aggregate asset to income ratio is identically equal to zero. While this may seem unrealistic, we deliberately chose to abstract from both types of assets. In a closed economy with incomplete markets and precautionary savings motives an increase in income uncertainty leads to higher precautionary saving, hence higher investment, a higher steady state capital stock and thus higher steady state production (see Aiyagari (1994) ). In our economy relaxed borrowing constraints drive the interest rate up and thus, in a version of the model with capital, the aggregate capital stock down.
Since in this paper we want to focus on the risk sharing properties of different taxation schemes rather than the effects of taxation and income uncertainty on capital accumulation, we compromise on realism to more clearly isolate the potential importance of the crowding-out mechanism introduced in this paper.
With respect to government debt, the government budget constraint would mandate that, for the same amount of outstanding government debt, the amount of taxes levied to finance the interest payments on the debt would vary across steady states, due to changes in the interest rate. Since the comparison of private households' welfare across economies with different tax burdens seems problematic, we also abstract from government debt in this paper.
Efficient Allocations
The next step in our analysis is to characterize and compute equilibrium allocations. Unfortunately this is hard to do by tackling the equilibrium directly. In particular, the presence of the infinite number of dynamic constraints (8) restricting the choice of state contingent claims does not allow to solve the household's problem as a standard dynamic programming problem. Therefore in this section we will follow Lucas (1992, 1995) to first characterize efficient allocations and then argue in the next section that they can be decentralized as competitive equilibrium allocations. As shown by Atkeson and Lucas solving for efficient allocations does reduce to solving a standard dynamic programming problem which makes their approach so useful for our problem. As they, however, we also have to restrict our analysis to stationary allocations, i.e. to allocations for which the cross-sectional consumption and wealth distribution is constant over time.
The key insight of Atkeson and Lucas is to analyze the problem of finding efficient allocations in terms of state contingent utility promises rather than state contingent consumption. Instead of being indexed by initial assets and endowment shock, now individuals are indexed by initial entitlements to expected discounted utility at period 0, w 0 and initial endowment shocks, y 0 . We will discuss the connection between initial asset positions and initial utility promises in Section 4. Let Φ 0 be the period 0 joint measure over (w 0 , y 0 ). An allocation is then a sequence {h t (w 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 that maps initial entitlements w 0 and sequences of shocks y t into levels of current utility in period t. Here h t (w 0 , y t ) is the current period utility that an agent of type (w 0 , y 0 ) receives if she experienced a history of endowment shocks y t . Note that c t (a 0 , y t ) = C(h t (w 0 , y t ))
for an agent whose utility entitlement w 0 corresponds to initial asset holdings a 0 , where C is the inverse of the period utility function as defined in Section 2. For any allocation h = {h t (w 0 , y
Equation (10) defines the continuation utility from an allocation h of agent of type (w 0 , y 0 ) from date t and shock history y t onwards.
Definition 2 An allocation {h t (w 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 is constrained feasible with respect to a joint distribution over utility entitlements and initial endowments,
An allocation {h t (w 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 is efficient with respect to Φ 0 if it is constrained feasible with respect to Φ 0 and there does not exist another allocation {ĥ t (w 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 that is constrained-feasible with respect to Φ 0 and such that
We call equation (11) the promise keeping constraint: the allocation delivers utility w 0 to agents entitled to w 0 . Equations (12) are the continuing participation constraints. 13 Equation (13) is a boundedness condition that assures that continuation utility goes to zero in the time limit. Equation (14) is the resource feasibility condition, requiring aggregate consumption in every period to be less or equal than aggregate endowment in that period. The definition basically says that a utility allocation is efficient if it attains the utility promises made by Φ 0 in an individually rational and resource feasible way and there is no other allocation that does so with less resources. In order to use recursive techniques, however, we have to restrict ourselves to stationary allocations. Define Φ t to be the joint measure over endowment shocks y t and continuation utilities U t (w 0 , y t , h) for a given allocation. An allocation is stationary if Φ t = Φ 0 = Φ. In the next subsections we will show that such an allocation exists, characterize it and demonstrate how to compute it.
Recursive Formulation
In order to solve for stationary efficient allocations we consider the problem of a planner that is responsible of allocating resources to a given individual and who can trade resources at a fixed intertemporal price 1 R . In this subsection we discuss such a planners' recursive problem and in the next subsection its solution.
We then show that the planners' policy functions induce a Markov process over utility promises and income shocks which has a unique invariant distribution, and finally we demonstrate that there exists an R * at which the resources needed to deliver utility promises dictated by the stationary distribution equal the aggregate endowment in the economy.
For constant R ∈ (1, 1 β ], consider the following functional equation (F E) problem. Individual state variables are the promise to expected discounted utility that an agent enters the period with, w, and the current income shock y. The planner chooses how much current period utility to give to the individual, h, and how much to promise her for the future, g y , conditional on her next periods endowment realization y .
We now make the following assumptions on the individual endowment process 
where V (w) is the resource cost for the planner to provide an individual with expected utility w when the intertemporal shadow price of resources for the planner is 1 R . The cost consists of the cost for utility delivered today, (1 − 1 R )C(h), and expected cost from tomorrow on, y π(y )V (g y ), discounted to today. Lucas (1992, 1995) show that a stationary allocation {h t (w 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 is efficient if it is induced by an optimal policy from the functional equation above with R > 1 and satisfies the resource constraint with equality.
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Equation (17) is the promise-keeping constraint: an individual that is entitled to w in fact receives utility w through the allocation rules {h(.), g y (.)} y ∈Y . The continuing participation constraints in equation (18) state that the social planner for each state tomorrow has to guarantee individuals an expected utility promise at least as high as obtained with the autarkic allocation. The utility in autarky is given as the solution to the functional equation in (3).
Existence and Characterization of Policy Functions for Fixed R
We first prove the existence of optimal allocation rules in the problem with the additional constraints g y ≤w in (18), wherew is an upper bound on future utility promises. We then characterize the solution of this problem and show that the additional constraints are not binding so that the solution to the problem with additional constraints is also solution to the original problem. 16 The modified Bellman equation is defined on
, that is, the space of continuous and bounded functions on W, where W = {w ∈ |w ≤ w ≤w} ⊆ D is a compact subset of and w := min y U Aut (y). This gives us a standard bounded dynamic programming problem. From now on we will denote by T R the operator defined above, but including the additional constraints.
Note that with the additional constraints on future utility promises, (17) and (18) imply that for every w in W possible choices h for current utility satisfy
Accordingly define h := h(w) andh :=h(w). We will show below that we can choosew = max y U Aut (y) + ε, for ε > 0 arbitrarily small, without the constraints g y (w) ≤w binding at the optimal solution, for all w ∈ W .
In order to assure that the constraint set of our dynamic programming problem is compact, for all w ∈ W we need (since D need not be compact)
Assumption 3 is an assumption purely on the fundamentals (u, π, Y, r) of the economy and hence straightforward to check. In particular, for r = −1 (the case studied by Kehoe and Levine (1993)) we havē
ymin is sufficiently small and/or β is sufficiently small.
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Using standard theory of dynamic programming with bounded returns it is easy to show that the operator T R has a unique fixed point V R ∈ C(W ) and that for all
with the norm being the sup-norm. Also V R is strictly increasing, strictly convex and continuously differentiable and the optimal policies h(w), g y (w) are continuous, single-valued functions.
18 16 Note that if we had assumed that u and hence C are bounded functions this complication is avoided as the upper bound on u serves as upper boundw. The results to follow do not require boundedness of u.
17 For CRRA utility with coefficient of relative risk aversion σ ≥ 1 and r = −1 assumption 3 is always satisfied. 18 The proofs of these results are again adaptations of proofs by Atkeson and Lucas (1995) .
We will now use the first order conditions to characterize optimal policies.
The envelope condition is:
First we characterize the behavior of h and g y with respect to w. The planner reacts to a higher utility promise w today by increasing current and expected future utility, i.e. by smoothing the cost over time and across states. The continuing participation constraints, though, prevent complete cost smoothing across different states: some agents have to be promised more than otherwise optimal in certain states to be prevented from defaulting in that state. This is exactly the reason why complete risk sharing may not be constrained feasible.
Lemma 3 Let assumptions 1-3 be satisfied. The optimal policy h, associated with the minimization problem in (16) is strictly increasing in w. The optimal policies g y , are constant in w and equal to U Aut (y ) or strictly increasing in w, for all y ∈ Y. Furthermore
The last part of the lemma states that future promises are equalized across states whenever the continuing participation constraints permit it. Promises are increased in those states in which the constraints bind.
Now we state a result that is central for the existence of an upper boundw of utility promises. For promises that are sufficiently high it is optimal to deliver most of it in terms of current period utility, and promise less for the future than the current promises. This puts an upper bound on optimal promises in the long run, the main result in this section, stated in Theorem 5
Lemma 4 Let assumptions 1-3 be satisfied. For every (w, y ) ∈ W ×Y, if g y (w) > U Aut (y ), then g y (w) < w. Furthermore, for each y , there exists a unique w y such that g y (w y ) = w y = U Aut (y ).
Proof. See Appendix
Theorem 5 Let assumptions 1-3 be satisfied. There exists aw such that g y (w) < w for every w ≥w and every y ∈ Y.
Note that the preceding theorem implies that whenever w ∈ [w,w] = W, then for all y ∈ Y, the constraint g y (w) ≤w is never binding; since the constraint set in the original dynamic programming problem without the additional constraints is convex, the policy functions characterized in this section are also the optimal policies for the original problem for all w ∈ W. For any (w 0 , y 0 ) ∈ W × Y these policies then induce efficient sequential allocations as described in Section 3.1.
The policy functions g y together with the transition matrix π induce a Markov process on W × Y. In the next subsection we will show that this Markov process has a unique invariant measure, the long-run cross sectional distribution of utility promises (and hence welfare) and income, for any given fixed R ∈ (1, 1 β ).
Existence and Uniqueness of an Invariant Probability Measure
Let B(W ) and P(Y ) the set of Borel sets of W and the power set of Y. The function g y (w), together with the transition function π for the endowment process, defines a Markov transition function on income shock realizations and utility promises Q :
Given this transition function, we define the operator T * on the space of probability measures An invariant probability measure associated with Q is defined to be a fixed point of T * . We now show that such a probability measure exists and is unique.
Theorem 6 Let assumptions 1-3 be satisfied. Then there exists a unique invariant probability measure Φ associated with the transition function Q defined above.
n converges to Φ in total variation norm.
Proof. See Appendix
Note that Lemma 4 and Theorem 5 above imply that any ergodic set of the Markov process associated with Q must lie within [U Aut (y min ), U Aut (y max )]×Y and that the support of the unique invariant probability measure is a subset of this set.
So far we proved that, for a fixed intertemporal price R, policy functions (h, g y ), cost functions V and invariant probability measures Φ exist and are unique. From now on we will index (h, g y ), V and Φ by R to make clear that these functions and measures were derived for a fixed R. In the next section we will discuss how to find the intertemporal price R * associated with an efficient stationary allocation. Remember from Subsection A that this requires the allocation to satisfy the aggregate resource constraint with equality, a constraint that we have not yet imposed and will do so in the next subsection in order to solve for R * .
Determination of the "Market Clearing" R
In this section we will analyze how the resource requirements imposed by the cross-sectional distribution of utility promises Φ R vary with R. We will provide conditions under which an R * exists for which these resource requirements exactly equal the aggregate endowment in the economy.
In the previous section we showed that for a fixed R ∈ (1, 1 β ) there exists a unique stationary joint distribution Φ R over (w, y). Define the "excess demand function" d : 1,
In this section we discuss the qualitative features of the function d(.). Since by assumptionȳ := ydΦ R does not vary with R, the behavior of d depends on how V R and Φ R vary with R. The behavior of Φ R with respect to R in turn depends on the behavior of g Thus, if one can show that
then the existence of a resource-clearing R * follows. In this subsection we characterize optimal policies of the planner for R = 1 β and provide a sufficient condition for (26) 
19 Again the arguments are adaptations of Atkeson and Lucas' (1995) . For continuity of d(R) one shows that V R is uniformly continuous in R and that g R y is continuous as a function of R so that Φ R is continuous in R (in the sense of weak convergence).
For monotonicity of d(R) the key results are that g R y is increasing in R so that Φ R (., y) is increasing in R (in the sense of stochastic dominance), which, together with the fact that V R is increasing in w proves that d(R) is an increasing function. 20 Also note that, given our previous theoretical results, it is straightforward to search for R * numerically: fix an R 0 , solve the planners' dynamic programming problem (which we proved to have a unique solution), determine the induced invariant measure over promises (whose existence and uniqueness we proved), and compute d(R 0 ). If d(R 0 ) > 0, reduce the guess for R, otherwise increase it. We have included details of our computational algorithm in the separate theoretical appendix.
from the first order conditions of the recursive planners' problem (which still has a unique solution as all the results of Section 3.2 go through). Now there is a continuum of invariant measures associated with the Markov chain induced by the optimal policies. From (27) it is clear that any such measure Φ 1 β satisfies w / ∈supp Φ 1 β for all w < U Aut (y max ) as the probability of leaving such a w is at least π(y max ) and the probability of coming back (into a small enough neighborhood) is 0. Therefore all w in the support of any possible invariant measure satisfy g y (w) = w. From the promise-keeping constraint h(w) = w follows, and each individuals' consumption is constant over time: for R = 1 β there is complete risk sharing. For complete risk sharing to be efficient it has to satisfy the resource constraint. Since the cost function V R is strictly increasing in w, the one of the continuum of invariant measures with lowest cost is
All individuals receive utility promises w = U Aut (y max ) and hence the same current utility h(U Aut (y max )) = U Aut (y max ). This allocation has per-period resource cost C(U Aut (y max )) and is resource feasible if and only if C(U Aut (y max )) ≤ȳ, or applying the strictly increasing period utility function u to both sides, if and only
Let the net resource cost of this allocation be denoted by
We summarize the discussion in the following Intuitively, the lemma states that it is constrained efficient to share resources equally among the population in this economy if the agents with the highest incentive to renege on this sharing rule, namely the agents with currently high income, find it in their interest to accept constant consumption at c =ȳ and lifetime utility u(ȳ), rather than to leave and obtain lifetime utility U Aut (y max ).
Using arguments similar to showing continuity of d(R) on (1,
is defined as in (29) . In order to rule out complete risk sharing 21 we now make
Note that this assumption is satisfied if the time discount factor β is sufficiently small, agents are not too risk-averse or the largest endowment shock is sufficiently large. We obtain
Proof. Applying the strictly increasing cost function C to the inequality of assumption 4 gives
The Case of R Approaching 1
In this subsection we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for autarky (all agents consume their endowment in each period) to be an efficient allocation and characterize policies for R approaching 1 from above.
If agents are very impatient and/or the risk of future low endowments is low, then it is not efficient for the planner to persuade currently rich agents to give up resources today in exchange for insurance tomorrow.
For r = −1 (no saving after default, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) )this result can be stated and proved formally in the next Lemma 9 Let r = −1 and let assumptions 1-3 be satisfied. Autarky is efficient if and only if
Proof. For the if-part we note that the autarkic allocation satisfies the first order conditions for some R > 1 if (30) holds. Since autarky is constrained feasible, it is efficient. 22 The only-if part is proved in the appendix.
The previous lemma provides a condition under which d(R) = 0 as R approaches 1, with autarky as the (efficient) allocation. In order to assure that autarky is not efficient 23 we make Assumption 5:
With assumption 5, as R approaches 1, the resulting allocation features some, but (as long as assumption 4 holds) not complete risk sharing. We state the following conjecture, which we were able to prove for CRRA utility, r = −1 and Y = {y l , y h } but not for the general case considered here.
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Conjecture 10 Let assumptions 1-5 be satisfied. Then there exists R > 1 such that d(R) < 0.
22 This is in fact true for arbitrary r ≥ −1.
23 If the efficient allocation is autarkic a small change in the tax system changes the allocation on a one to one basis with after tax incomes. No private insurance is crowded out since no private insurance takes place. 24 Given our other theoretical results, we can check whether d(R) < 0 for R sufficiently close to 1 numerically. In all our quantitative experiments this was the case.
We then can conclude our theoretical analysis of stationary efficient allocations with the following theorem, whose proof follows directly from the previous lemmas and conjecture.
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Theorem 11 Let assumptions 1-5 be satisfied. There exists R * ∈ (1,
) is efficient and has some, but not complete risk sharing.
As indicated above, some of our results and proof strategies resemble Atkeson and Lucas (1995) . The basic strategy to prove existence of a stationary general equilibrium (as we will show in the next section stationary efficient allocations induce stationary equilibrium allocations) also exhibits similarities to existence proofs for standard incomplete markets models as in Bewley (1986) , Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) .
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The main difference is that the authors, due to the simple asset structure in their models, can tackle the equilibrium directly. As we do, they first, for a fixed and constant interest rate, solve a simple dynamic programming problem 27 (they for the single household, with assets as state variable, we for the planners, with utility promises as state variables). Then they let the optimal policies induce a Markov process to which a unique invariant distribution is shown to exist. 28 Finally the market clearing interest rate is determined from the goods or asset market clearing condition. 29 These similarities in the theoretical analysis also suggest similar computational algorithms when solving both models numerically.
Decentralization
In this section we describe how we decentralize a stationary efficient allocation h = {h t (w 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 induced by the optimal policies from the recursive planners' problem as a competitive equilibrium as defined in Section 3. Let β t π(y t |y 0 )µ(a 0 , y t ) ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the continuing participation constraint at history y t and P (y t ) = {y τ |π(y t |y τ ) > 0} be the set of all endowment shock histories that can have y t as its continuation. Using the first order necessary conditions of the household's maximization problem (6) one obtains
25 No claim of uniqueness can be made. In all our numerical exercises d(R) was strictly increasing, however, yielding a unique R * and associated unique stationary efficient allocation. 26 We will contrast the quantitative findings from our model with the Bewley (1986) and Huggett (1993) version of the standard exogenous incomplete markets model in the quantitative secition of the paper.
27 As in our model, boundedness of the state space for assets from above has to be assured. Huggett (1993) assumes that income can only take two values, but doesn't need the stochastic process to be iid over time nor any assumption on the period utility function. Aiyagari assumes iid income and u to be bounded and to have bounded relative risk aversion -see his working paper. We do not require any boundedness assumption on u, but need the iid assumption. 28 The theorems invoked for the existence of a unique invariant measure are similar in spirit; in particular they all require a "mixing condition" that assures that there is a unique ergodic set. In their setting agents with bad income shocks run down their assets, and good income shocks induce upward jumps in the asset position; in our setting agents with bad shocks move down in the entitlement distribution towards U Aut (y min ), with good shocks inducing jumps towards higher w, due to binding participation constraints.
29 Huggett (1993) provides no theoretical properties of the excess asset demand function, in Aiyagari (1994) the presence of physical capital, which makes the supply of assets interest-elastic, assures (together with continuity of the asset demand function) the existence of a market-clearing interest rate.
Obviously, an agent whose participation constraint does not bind at contingency y t+1 , following history y t , faces the standard complete markets Euler equation (as µ(a 0 , y t+1 ) = 0). Now consider the efficient allocation of utilities {h t (w 0 , y t )} as found in the previous section. Combining the first order condition and the envelope condition from the planners problem we have for an agent that is unconstrained 30 (see (20) and (21)):
This suggests that the equilibrium prices satisfy (with normalization of p 0 = 1)
with p t = R −t . That is, the price for a commodity delivered contingent on personal histories is composed of two components, an aggregate intertemporal price p t = R −t and an individual specific, history dependent component, equal to the probability that the personal history occurs.
Given prices, the initial wealth level that makes the efficient consumption allocation affordable for an agent of type (w 0 , y 0 ) is given by
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the efficient consumption allocation is bounded from above. 31 Finally, the equilibrium consumption allocation corresponding to the efficient allocation is given
The preceding discussion can be summarized in the following Theorem 12 Suppose that {h t (w 0 , y t )} ∞ t=0 is a stationary efficient allocation (with associated shadow interest rate R > 1 β ). Then prices {p t (y t )} and allocations {c t (a 0 , y t )} , as defined in (34) and (36) are an equilibrium for initial wealth distribution Θ 0 derived from Φ 0 and (35).
Proof. See Appendix
So far we have shown the existence of a stationary equilibrium of our economy and characterized some of its properties. In the next section we illustrate some of its qualitative features. 30 If no agent is unconstrained we are in autarky and can take
. 31 Therefore, to decentralize a particular stationary efficient consumption allocation we require a very particular initial distribution over initial assets. In this sense one of the primitives of our model, Θ 0 , can't be chosen arbitrarily, which is true in all steady state analyses. 32 Given that the optimal recursive policy function h(., y) is a strictly increasing function in w, the ht(., y t ) and hence the ct(., y t ) are strictly increasing in w 0 . Therefore a 0 (., y 0 ) is strictly increasing and thus invertible. We denote its inverse by a −1 0 .
Qualitative Features of the Efficient Allocation
In this section we illustrate some of the qualitative features of the efficient allocation characterized in the section above. To do so we consider a simple numerical example of our economy in which the after-tax income process is iid can take only two values, 0 ≤ y l < y h ≤ 2, which are equally likely. Note that since the average after-tax endowments are normalized to 1 we have y l = 2 − y h .
In order to highlight the qualitative differences of efficient allocations in our model with a continuum of agents and in the model with a small number of agents (the case typically studied in the literature) we also present results for a limited commitment model with two agents i = 1, 2, each of which has endowment y i ∈ {y l , y h }. We assume that in the two agent economy incomes are perfectly negatively correlated 33 , so that if agent 1 has income y l , agent 2 has income y h and vice versa. 34 Consequently, as in the continuum economy, average income in the economy is nonstochastic and equal to 1. In accordance with the continuum economy we also assume that the income process in the two-agent economy is iid over time, with equal probability of each agent being rich in every period.
For both economies we assume that the outside option is characterized by r = −1, that is, no saving in autarky is permitted. Then it is straightforward to compute that for both economies the utilities from autarky are given by
We note that the size of y h is a measure of income risk, with higher y h associated with more income risk. It is straightforward to show that U Aut (y l ) is strictly declining in y h , whereas U Aut (y h ) is strictly increasing in y h at y h = 1, and strictly concave with unique maximum y * h ∈ (1, 2) (see Krueger and Perri, 2006 ). The maximum satisfies 1 2
We now want to characterize and compare symmetric (across agents) constrained efficient stationary consumption distributions across the two models. We are particularly interested in the potential qualitative and quantitative differences of comparative statics results with respect to changes in after-tax income dispersion y h , that is, changes of the progressivity of the tax code.
To put this example into the context of the tax system we will use in our quantitative examples, suppose that pre-tax endowment can take two values e l < e h with equal probability and recall we have assumed that mean income equals 1. The tax system is characterized by a constant marginal tax rate τ and a constant transfer d so that
Budget balance of the government implies that τ = d and so the after-tax incomes are given by
and average taxes (net of transfers) are given by
Thus as long as τ > 0 the tax system is progressive (t (e) > 0) and the progressivity of the tax system increases with τ (since dt (e) δτ > 0) and y h decreases with τ . Thus a reduction in y h is equivalent to a more progressive tax system, holding the pre-tax endowment process constant. Thus all comparative statics results with respect to y h to follow can be interpreted as a change in the progressivity of the tax code; with more progressivity representing a lower value of y h .
Three Risk Sharing Regimes
In both economies efficient consumption allocations are either characterized by autarky (everybody consumes its after-tax income in all states), perfect risk sharing (everybody consumes average income of 1 in all states) or partial, but not perfect risk sharing. Keeping fixed preferences (u, β), one can define, for both models, critical income values (i.e. critical levels of tax progression) for y h , 
Full Risk Sharing
Perfect risk sharing entails consuming average incomeȳ = 1 for all agents, in each state. For this allocation to be constrained efficient it must satisfy all enforcement constraints. It is straightforward to show that this
in both economies j = 2, c.
The two critical values y f 2 = y f c > 1 satisfy the above equations with equality, unless even at y h = 2, the equations hold with strict inequality. Perfect risk sharing occurs for exactly the same set of y h values (and thus the same range of tax progressivity) in the continuum economy and the two-agent economy. As long as there is perfect risk sharing, a marginal change in tax progressivity y h has no effect on the consumption allocation in either economy: in both economies there is exactly a one-for-one crowding out of private risk sharing from public risk sharing.
Autarky
Autarky may be the only feasible allocation, and thus the (constrained-) efficient allocation. For the continuum economy autarky is efficient if and only if (see Lemma 5) u (y h ) ≥ βu (2 − y h ) and for the two agent economy it is efficient if and only if (see Krueger and Perri, 2006) .
Thus we conclude that y .Thus the set of values of income (risk) y h for which the constrained efficient allocation is autarkic is strictly bigger in the two agent economy than in the continuum economy. In this sense, there is more risk sharing possible in a continuum economy than in the two-agent economy.
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In this region of the parameter space, a small change in y h (equivalently in the progressivity of tax system) changes the consumption distribution one-for one with the income distribution. There is no crowding-out effect induced by a change in the tax system. Again, the absence of a crowding out effect occurs for a wider set of parameter values (tax rates) in the two agent economy, relative to the continuum economy.
Partial Risk Sharing
For all y h ∈ (y aut c , y f c ) (respectively, for all y h ∈ (y aut 2 , y f 2 ) in the two agent economy) the stationary constrained efficient consumption distribution is characterized by partial risk sharing. In the next subsection we will characterize this distribution further in both economies, with particular focus on how it changes with the measure of inequality y h ,and thus with the degree of tax progressivity. 35 Note that y aut 2 = y * 2 (the level of y h that maximizes the value of autarky for the currently rich household). 
Consumption Dynamics with Partial Risk Sharing in the Two
and satisfies c h ∈ (1, y h ). Furthermore Krueger and Perri (2006) show that within the range y h ∈ (y The efficient stationary consumption distribution is formally characterized as follows:
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Proposition 13 For a given interest rate R the constrained efficient stationary consumption allocation is characterized by a number n > 2, and ordered consumption levels c 1 , c 2 , . . . c n ,ordered lifetime utility levels w 1, w 2 , . . . , w n and associated probabilities π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π n such that:
1. The stationary consumption and utility distribution is given by
2. The consumption and utility levels satisfy
and
3. The interest rate itself if determined from the resource constraint
For a given n, equations (38), (39) and (41) form a system of 2n + 1 equations in the unknowns c 1 , c 2 , . . . c n , w 1, w 2 , . . . , w n , R. If for a given n, equation (40) is satisfied an there in no larger n such that this is true, we have found the optimal step size. 38 While it seems impossible to fully analytically derive the n consumption levels and provide comparative statics with respect to income dispersion y h , the following result immediately follows from the previous proposition.
Corollary 14
In the continuum economy we have (from the first and third equation of (38)) that c 1 = y l and c n < y h . 37 Krueger and Uhlig (2006) prove a similar result, in a model with exogenous interest rates where the consequence of default is not financial autarky, but the best insurance contract a competing financial intermediary offers. The proof of the characterization of the efficient consumption and lifetime utility allocation in this paper is identical to the one in Krueger and Uhlig (2006) and hence omitted.
38 This simple algorithm is only applicable in the iid case with two shocks, however. For a more general endowment process the computational method based on the theory developed above and described in detail in the appendix needs to be used to compute stationary constrained-efficient allocations.
In summary, in the case of partial risk sharing the continuum economy insures households against bad income shock by allowing consumption decline slowly over time, relative to the two agent economy. This comes at the cost that consumption eventually falls to a lower level than in the two agent economy, albeit only in the unlikely event of a sequence of bad income shocks. Also, the allocation in the continuum economy features history dependence in that it depends on the length of the sequence of bad shocks, whereas in the two-agent economy the consumption allocation in this example only depends on the current shock.
Since changes in income dispersion y h induce changes in the interest rate R it is hard to derive further clear-cut comparative statics results. Note, however, that the previous corollary immediately implies that, in stark contrast to the two-agent economy, an increase in y h and thus a decrease in y l reduces the lower end of the support of the consumption distribution. Thus an increase in in tax progressivity, while leading to more consumption dispersion and lower minimum consumption in the two-agent model, leads to an increase of minimum consumption in the continuum model. These results demonstrate that the version of the limited commitment model with only two (classes of) households has qualitatively different implications for the efficient distribution of consumption and the impact on this distribution of a change in the progressivity of the tax code than the continuum model with its richer (and arguably more realistic) consumption and wealth distribution
In the remainder of the paper we now want to document that the quantitative importance of the crowdingout effect of private through public insurance is potentially large in a realistically parameterized version of the continuum economy.
A Quantitative Example
In this section it is our goal to study the quantitative impact of changes in the progressivity of the tax system on the amount of risk sharing in equilibrium. In particular we use the model to measure the extent to which public risk sharing mechanisms (i.e. progressive taxes) and private risk sharing mechanisms (i.e. financial markets) interact in insulating private consumption from random income fluctuations. In order to do so we specify and estimate a simple statistical process for pre-tax labor income risk on US household data, and then study, for a given set of preference parameters, how a change in the tax system affects risk sharing and steady state consumption allocations.
We would like to stress that we restrict attention to the long-run consequences of different tax codes on private financial markets and overall risk sharing, rather than characterizing the entire transition path induced by a tax reform. Therefore, while in our simple model long-run effects of changes in the tax code on risk sharing map one-for-one into ex-ante welfare of households, we do not emphasize the normative implications of the model (nor do we propose to use our model to study optimal policy, as optimal tax policy is likely to depend on a variety of factors omitted here, including the explicit consideration of transitional dynamics). 
Functional Forms and Parameterization
We now describe the estimation of the pre-tax labor income process, the class of tax functions we consider in our experiments and the parameterization of preferences and the consequences of default.
Labor Income Risk
We specify the process for log pre-tax labor income of household i as a simple AR(1) process log e it = ρ log e it−1 + ε it
This process is meant to capture idiosyncratic labor income shocks (risk) of US households, and is fully characterized by the two parameters ρ and σ ε . In order to separately identify the two parameters in (42) we use micro data with a panel dimension provided the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). We select the set all households in the CEX over the period 2000-2007, whose head is between the age of 25 and 60 and which have positive labor income for two consecutive periods.
40 Consistently with the model we measure income as real labor earnings before taxes from all members of the household. Since in the model all households have the same size we divide real total labor income by the number of adult equivalents in the household. Then in order to exclude from our data permanent differences across households and aggregate risk 41 the income measures are regressed each year on a set of individual controls (which include quarter and education dummies, a quartic in age and age-education interactions). The residuals from those regressions are the data equivalent of log e it in the process (42) . Since for each household we have exactly two observations we can estimate time varying parameters ρ t and σ εt for each period using the following simple cross sectional moment conditions: ρ t = cov(log e it , log e it−1 ) var(log e it−1 ) σ 2 εt = var(log e it ) − ρ t var(log e it−1 )
and finally obtain estimates of ρ and σ ε as the simple time averages of ρ t and σ εt from the first quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2007. We estimate ρ = 0.8014 (with a standard error of 0.03) and σ 2 ε = 0.1849 (with a standard error of 0.021). These estimates reveal that labor income risk quite persistent, but also contains a sizeable transitory component (possibly due to measurement error). These two general findings set of feasible distributions of lifetime expected discounted utilities this economy can attain with given aggregate resources (which remain unchanged). Thus, for a particular agent the promised utility w she entered the period with is not necessarily a valid description of her state after the change in fiscal policy (a probability zero event) anymore. Consequently a method that employs promised expected utility as a state variable cannot be employed to compute transitional dynamics induced by unexpected policy innovations. Any transition analysis in this economy has to tackle the (sequential) competitive equilibrium directly, as we do in Krueger and Perri (2006) .
40 A significant fraction of households in the CEX sample report their labor income in the past year at two consecutive points in time, on average 10 month apart. We use CEX as opposed to PSID as CEX has a larger sample size (although the panel dimension is much smaller). We conjecture that similar estimates would be obtained from PSID data since Heathcote et al. (2009) document that the CEX and the PSID income data align rather well along a number of cross-sectional dimensions.
41 These are not explicitly modeled in our theoretical analysis that focuses on idiosyncratic risk.
are consistent with a number of studies (see for example MaCurdy, 1982 ) that estimate statistical processes for household earnings or income.
In order to map the estimated process into our theory in which pre-tax labor income follows a finite state Markov chain we discretize the continuous AR(1) process into a finite state Markov chain with 5 states using the Tauchen procedure. Finally we re-normalize the value of all income states (after translating these states from logs into levels) such that mean pre-tax labor income equals to 1.
Fiscal Policy
Since the purpose of our quantitative exercise is to document the potential quantitative importance of the crowding-out mechanism, rather than to argue that the crowding-out effect is larger than one in the actual US economy we restrict ourselves to the same simple one-parameter family of tax functions as in section 5 for which the degree of public risk sharing can be varied in a transparent way. Therefore, as above we assume that the tax code is given by a constant marginal tax rate τ and a fixed deduction (or transfer) d, so that the tax code is given by
Recall that, given our normalization of average pre-tax income in the economy toē = 1, the government budget constraint implies d = τ , and after-tax income y is given by
The policy parameter τ ∈ ( −emin 1−emin , 1] here measures the constant marginal tax rate but also, given a balanced budget, the size of lump sum transfers to households. Since marginal taxes are proportional and transfers are lump sum, the higher is τ the larger is the degree of redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky households, i.e. the extent of public risk sharing. Notice that as τ approaches −emin 1−emin from above, the tax system actually magnifies income risk faced by households. At the other extreme when τ = 1 the government tax and transfer system eliminates income risk faced by households altogether: after-tax income y is constant and equal to 1 regardless of a household's pre-tax income realization e.
Preferences and Consequences of Default
We assume that households have log-utility, u(c) = log(c), are not permitted to save after default, r = −1 and document results for various combinations of time discount factors β ∈ (0, 1). The essential trade-off determining the extent of private risk sharing in equilibrium involves a comparison between the value of staying in the risk sharing agreement, relative to the value of being excluded from financial markets. The impact on both of these values of varying risk aversion σ and saving returns r after default are qualitatively similar to the impact of varying β. A higher β as well as a higher risk aversion σ and a reduction in r (which makes consumption smoothing in autarky harder) increases the value of having access to risk sharing 
Three Measures of Risk Sharing
Before we present our numerical results we define different measures of risk sharing which we will use to quantify the change in after-tax income and consumption risk faced by households induced by changes in the tax code. We define Total Intermediation (T I) of risk as one minus the ratio between the standard deviations of consumption to the standard deviation of pre-tax income:
Note that when std(c) = 0, T I = 1, consumption does not vary at all across individuals and the economy exhibits complete risk sharing. If std(c) = std(e), T I = 0 and consumption varies one for one with pre-tax endowments For 0 < T I < 1 there is some, but not complete risk sharing, with higher T I indicating higher risk sharing.
We can decompose T I into two components reflecting risk intermediation enforced by the government (GI) via the tax system and risk intermediation achieved in addition by private insurance contracts, (P I).
Similar to T I we define as
Note that given our tax function it follows that std(y) = (1 − τ )std(e) so that government intermediation equals GI = τ and thus GI measures nothing else but the progressivity of the tax code.
To interpret P I note that if std(c) = 0, P I = 0 and there is complete risk sharing achieved through private markets. If, on the other hand std(c) = std(y), P I = 0 and private markets do not achieve any risk sharing over and above that implemented by the tax system. A simple calculation shows that
Hence total intermediation of risk equals government intermediation of risk plus private intermediation of that part of risk that is not already removed by the tax system. In particular, under our tax system when τ = 0 it implies that GI = 0 and hence T I = P I. 1−emin (which in our example is around -0.32) the tax system is regressive enough to bring the value of after-tax income in the lowest state close to 0 so that the value of autarky approaches −∞, and the first best, full risk sharing allocation is enforceable. In this case total intermediation (and private intermediation as is clear from equation (44)) are exactly 100% and the gross real interest rate is equal to 1/β. On the other end of the spectrum, if τ = 1 full insurance is achieved through government intermediation alone: total intermediation is again 100% and the interest rate is 1/β. In the middle range of government intermediation τ perfect risk sharing is not achievable, total intermediation is less than 100 and the corresponding interest rate falls below its complete markets level of 1/β. The fact that the first best allocation can be achieved with extremely regressive or extremely progressive taxes is a strong prediction of this model, but not one that we think is very relevant for the design of optimal policy, as obviously in real economies there are many factors which we abstract from in our setup (e.g. disincentive effects on labor supply, equity considerations) that will make such extreme policies undesirable. The more relevant conclusion from our model is that government tax policy, regardless of what motivates it, has a potential effect on the incentives that sustain of private risk sharing. The effects of public risk sharing in three economies since a reduction of income risk through progressive taxation diminishes the need for private markets to supply insurance. This "displacement" effect is at work in any model with a complete set of assets in which private and public risk sharing are perfect substitutes, in the sense that both channels can provide insurance costlessly and state-contingently. However, the displacement effect can at most explain a 100% crowding-out of private insurance by public insurance. The second effect is specific to the limited commitment model studied in this paper, and it stems from the fact that public intermediation, by reducing income risk of households, increases the value of being excluded from financial markets and hence tightens the enforcement constraints. This "tightening" effect together with the displacement effect can generate an overall crowdingout effect that is larger than a 100%, that is, it can imply that when the government increases public intermediation by raising the progressivity of the income tax code total intermediation falls. Observe from figure 4 that exactly this happens when the discount factor takes a value of β = 0.95, the top solid line in panel (a). When β = 0.9 total intermediation is essentially flat (it is in fact very mildly U-shaped) and when β = 0.8 the crowding-out effect is always less than 100%, i.e. when public intermediation increases so does total intermediation.
Quantitative Results: Limited Commitment Model
Why does the magnitude of the crowding-out effect crucially depend on the time discount factor? Different β's effectively measure the effectiveness of private intermediation: the higher the β, the more households value future consumption insurance through private markets, and therefore the easier it is to enforce contracts. This implies that in high β economies private households make large use of private intermediation and hence there is the potential for a large displacement effect. This, together with the tightening effect can lead to more than 100% crowding out. When β is low financial markets are less effective in providing insurance (the enforcement constraints are tighter), there is less potential for a large displacement effect and a crowding-out effect in excess of 100% is less likely to materialize. At the extreme, consider the limiting case in which β is so low that the economy is in autarky (and remains there after a change in tax policy). In this case public risk sharing has no "displacement" nor "tightening" effect, and any given increase in public risk sharing causes an equal increase in total intermediation. Finally notice (panel b) that in the range of τ we display in figure 4 interest rates are always a declining function of public intermediation. This provides further direct evidence of the tightening effect induced by higher public risk sharing. Since lower income risk (due to higher τ ) tightens borrowing constraints (by raising the value of autarky) it reduces the aggregate demand for credit, thus lowering the required equilibrium interest rate.
Quantitative Results: Standard Incomplete Markets Model
In this section we contrast our findings on the effects of changes in public risk sharing (government intermediation) in a limited commitment economy to the effects of the same changes in a standard incomplete markets model. In this economy agents are only permitted to trade a single uncontingent bond and they face an exogenously specified constant borrowing limit b.
42 By assumption enforcement frictions are absent in this model. The specific model we consider is most similar to the one studied by Huggett (1993) and shares the same market structure and the same continuum of households with the models of Bewley (1986) and Aiyagari (1994) . The household problem in recursive formulation reads as v(a, y) = max
where a are holdings of the one-period bond at the beginning of the period and R is the gross real interest rate on these bonds. As with the previous model we compare stationary equilibria under different tax systems.
To enable an exact comparison with the limited commitment economy we also use the same preferences and multiple discount factors, while we set the maximum amount that can be borrowed by households to an amount equivalent to five times average income. 43 Figure 5 reports how total and private intermediation (panel a) and interest rates (panel b) respond to changes in government intermediation in the standard incomplete markets economy.
First note that, similar to the previous model, as government intermediation increases private intermediation (the dashed lines in figure 5 ) falls, suggesting the presence of a crowding-out effect under this market structure as well. The intuition behind this crowding-out effect is quite different here, though. When larger government intermediation reduces income risk of households, it also reduces the incentive of consumers of engaging in precautionary saving. With a weaker precautionary motive households behave more like "Permanent Income" consumers, which leads to a more dispersed long-run wealth distribution as τ increases. 44 Such 42 Since average income is normalized toȳ = 1, b has the interpretation of the fraction of average income that a household can borrow.
43 We obtain qualitatively similar findings for tighter levels of the household borrowing constraint. 44 In this model the desire to engage in precautionary saving is driven both by strictly convex marginal utility as well as potentially binding borrowing constraints. Note however that the borrowing constraint we employ in this example is rather that feature much tighter borrowing constraints we found, not surprisingly, that the crowding-out effect is significantly smaller. With less generous borrowing constraints the long-run asset distribution is more narrowly bounded and therefore the corresponding consumption distribution is significantly less dispersed.
We conclude this section by highlighting two additional crucial differences between the responses to changes in government intermediation in the two models.
First, although the crowding-out effect of private insurance from public insurance can be substantial even in the standard incomplete markets model we never found it to be larger than a 100% in any of them many quantitative examples we considered. Therefore in this model in which the structure of financial markets is unaffected by government policy (both the set of assets that are being traded as well as the borrowing constraints are policy-invariant) more public intermediation always leads to better overall consumption insurance (and consequently to higher ex-ante steady state welfare). We conjecture the reason for this finding to be the following. In the standard incomplete markets model public and private intermediation are not perfect substitutes since public intermediation provides state contingent insurance while private loose (although it is not completely absent as in pure versions of the permanent income model).
intermediation takes the form of uncontingent self -insurance through borrowing and lending. Thus more public intermediation always improves the long run consumption risk allocation and hence long run welfare.
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Second the effect of government policy on real interest rates is qualitatively different in the limited commitment and the standard incomplete markets model. In the former more publicly provided risk sharing cause, in the relevant range of τ , a reduction in the equilibrium interest rate (see again figure 4 , panel b), because larger τ tightens enforcement constraints and hence reduces demand for borrowing. In the standard incomplete markets economy in contrast the equilibrium interest rate is increasing in government intermediation (see figure 5, panel b) . Higher government intermediation mitigates labor income risk and thus reduces the precautionary demand for saving which in turn drives down the equilibrium interest rate.
This effect is largely absent in the limited commitment economy, due to the availability of a full set of state-contingent assets. 46 
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a model that highlights a new channel through which the provision of public income insurance through progressive income taxation endogenously impacts the operation of private financial markets. By changing the incentives to default on private financial contracts government policy alters the extent to which private financial can provide consumption insurance against after-tax income risk. We demonstrated that when private labor income insurance markets are active, public risk sharing provided via taxes crowds out private risk sharing. In order to gain some insights into the potential quantitative magnitude of this effect we measured the extent of household labor income risk from US household data and confronted consumers in our model with this risk. In our quantitative example we found that the magnitude of the crowding-out effect can be very substantial. In fact, for plausible parameterizations of the model an increase in public risk sharing via the tax system can lead to a more than 100% crowding-out of private insurance and thus an overall reduction of total consumption risk sharing. By attempting to provide better consumption insurance the government induces more consumption risk in equilibrium.
In contrast, if private insurance markets are assumed to be missing for model-exogenous reasons (and thus there is no interaction between the extent of public insurance and the structure of private markets), as in the standard incomplete markets model developed by Bewley (1986) , a tax reform that reduces the variance of after-tax income serves as am effective partial substitute for private insurance markets and always increases the amount of consumption risk sharing in the economy. This finding indicates that the assumption about the exact structure of private capital markets is crucial when analyzing social insurance policies. 45 We want to stress that although we experimented with many possible parameters configurations and never have encountered the crowding-out effect to exceed 100% in the standard incomplete markets model we were not able to obtain a formal theoretical proof of this result. We therefore think it is conceivable (albeit not very likely, given our numerical results) that, even in the standard incomplete market model the long-run crowding out of private intermediation from public risk sharing could potentially exceed 100%.
46 Due to the presence of (state-contingent) borrowing constraints in the limited commitment model the precautionary motive to save is not entirely absent from this model either.
In order to isolate the effect of the tax system on private insurance markets and on risk sharing as clearly as possible we focused on comparison of steady state equilibria and abstracted from several features of actual economies that are potentially important in the analysis of tax policy, most notably its potential distortions of labor-leisure and capital accumulation decisions as well as its redistributive consequences. A comprehensive quantitative positive and normative analysis of progressive taxation that incorporate the effects we highlight in this work into a model featuring these distortions and equity concerns and considers transitional dynamics is called for, in our view. We defer such analysis to future research.
We show that there exist allocations that attain the joint measureΦ defined aŝ 
The autarkic allocation exhausts all resources. The new allocation reduces consumption for the π(y max ) agents with y max by δ max and increases consumption for π(y max )π(y min ) agents by δ min . Hence, compared to the autarkic allocation the change in resource requirements is given by 
Under this condition the new allocation is resource feasible, incentive feasible and attainsΦ, a distribution that dominates Φ Aut . It is straightforward to construct the sequential allocation h induced by the recursive policies supportingΦ. By reducing h 0 (U Aut (y min ), y min ) so that the agents receiving discounted utilityŵ underΦ receive U Aut (y min ) the new allocation attains Φ Aut but with less resources, a contradiction to the assumption that autarky is constrained efficient.
Proof of Theorem 12
The allocation satisfies the resource constraint (9) since the efficient allocation does and Θ 0 is derived from Φ 0 . Also the allocation satisfies the continuing participation constraints, and, by construction of a 0 (w 0 , y 0 ), the budget constraint. It remains to be shown that {c t (a 0 , y t )} is utility maximizing among the allocations satisfying the budget and the continuing participation constraints. The first order conditions 
are sufficient for consumer optimality. βRu (ct+1(a0,y t+1 )) ≥ 1, with equality if the limited enforcement constraint is not binding. Hence µ(a 0 , y t+1 ) ≥ 0 and µ(a 0 , y t+1 ) = 0 if the constraint is not binding. By construction the allocation and multipliers satisfy the first order conditions. pected continuation utility from any history y T onward, discounted at market prices R −T goes to zero as T → ∞ (i.e. the relevant transversality condition is satisfied). For details see the separate theoretical appendix, available at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/˜dkrueger/research/theoreticalapp.pdf.
